University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 26
Number 2 Spring 1996

Article 11

1996

Recent Developments: Vernonia School Dist. 47J v.
Acton: Random Drug Testing of Student Athletes
Not Violative of Their Fourth Amendment Right
against Unreasonable Searches
Francis A. Pommett III

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Pommett, Francis A. III (1996) "Recent Developments: Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton: Random Drug Testing of Student
Athletes Not Violative of Their Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 26 :
No. 2 , Article 11.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol26/iss2/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Vernonia
SchoolDist 47J
v. Acton:
RANDOM DRUG
TESTING OF
STUDENT ATHLETES
NOT VIOLATIVE
OF THEIR
FOURlli
AMENDMENT
RIGHT AGAINST
UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES.

In Vernonia School
District 47Jv. Acton, 115 S. Ct.
2386(1995), the Supreme Court
of the United States held that a
public school district's student
athlete drug policy, which provided for random drug testing
prior to participation in a sport,
did not violate the student's
Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable searches.
In so holding the Court has
broadened the scope of acceptable bodily intrusions on students by the government without individualized suspicion.
In response to a high
level of drug use reaching epidemic proportions, Vernonia
School District 47 J ("District")
instituted a policy of random
urinalysis drug testing for its
student athletes prior to their
participation in the schools'
sports programs. The testing
on athletes was instituted, in
part, because athletes had been
found to be leading the school's
drug culture, and also because
athletes who used drugs had a
higher rate of serious injury.
James Acton ("Acton"), a seventh grader in Vernonia, Oregon, signed up to play football
in the fall of 1991. Acton and
his parents refused to sign the
urine testing consent form, a
prerequisite to participation.
Subsequently, Acton and his
parents filed suit in the United
States District Court for the
District of Oregon, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
on the grounds that it violated
Acton's Fourth Amendment
right against unreasonable
searches, and Article I, section

9 of the Oregon Constitution.
Following a bench trial, the district court upheld the constitutionality ofthe District's policy
and dismissed the case. Acton
appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, which reversed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court ofthe United States
granted the District's petition
for certiorari.
The Court began its
analysis by reiterating that state
compelled collection and testing ofurine constituted a search
and was subject to Fourth
Amendment scrutiny. Acton,
115 S. Ct. at 2390 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602,617
(1989)). The Court explained
that "the ultimate measure of
the constitutionality of a governmental search is 'reasonableness. '" Id Thus, whether a
search is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment is determined by "'balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against its
promotion of legitimate governmental interests. '" I d (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619).
Justice Scalia, speaking for the
Court, opined that since a warrant was not required to establish reasonableness in all government searches, probable
cause was also not required
'''when special needs, beyond
the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant
and probable-cause requirement
impracticable. '" Id. at 2391
(quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U.S. 873 (1987)). Because
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the warrant requirement would
"unduly interfere" with teachers' and school administrators'
ability to maintain order and
discipline within the school setting, and since the public school
system had been found to have
such special needs in the past,
the Court concluded that a warrant was not required by the
Fourth Amendment in this situation. Id. (citing New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340
(1985)). Furthermore, while
school searches based on suspicion had been approved, individualized suspicion itself was
not a Fourth Amendment requirement, so long as the search
met the reasonableness standard. Id
In determining the reasonableness of such a warrantless search, the Court began by
looking to the nature of the privacy interest upon which the
search intruded. Id Since the
Fourth Amendment only protects those expectations of privacy that society recognizes as
legitimate, Justice Scalia reasoned that a schoolchild placed
in the temporary custody and
care of the State acting as a
schoolmaster did,. not have such
a reasonable expectation. Id at
2391-92. As support for this
lessened expectation of privacy, Justice Scalia noted that
schoolchildren are required to
have physical examinations and
to have been vaccinated before
attending public schools. Id
Student athletes, in particular,
have even less of a legitimate
privacy expectation, as locker
rooms are not known for their
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privacy, and students must undergo physicals prior to playing. Id. at 2392-93.
The Court next addressed the character of the intrusion. Id. at 2393. While
recognizing that the collection
of urine intruded upon '" an excretory function traditionally
shielded by great privacy, '" the
degree of intrusion depended
upon the method and monitoring of the collection. Id. (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626).
In the instant case, the process
and method of obtaining the
urine samples was nearly identical to those conditions found
in a public rest room. Id. Furthermore, because the test
screened only for drugs and the
results were given only to a
limited number of school personnel, the Court held that the
invasion ofthe student athlete's
privacy was not significant. Id.
at 2393-94.
Lastly, the Court addressed "the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue ... and the efficacy
of this means for meeting it."
Id at2394. TheFourthAmendment does not require the least
intrusive means available for a
warrantless search to be legitimate. Id. at 2396. Therefore,
the District's method and process of testing was not unreasonable in light of the district
court's finding that the students
were in a state of rebellion due
to drug and alcohol abuse. Id. at
2395-96. The Court thus concluded that the District's policy
satisfied the requirement of reasonableness and was therefore

constitutional. Id at 2396. It
warned, however,
that
suspicionless drug testing in
other contexts would most likely not pass constitutional muster, thereby narrowing the scope
of its decision. Id.
In dissent, Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justices
Stevens and Souter, argued that
the majority had dispensed with
the requirement of individualized suspicion. Id. at 2397.
Looking to the intent of the
Framers, the dissent argued that
the Warrant Clause was drafted
to curb the abuse of all general
searches, infamous during colonial times, and not to impose
an "evenhandedness requirement" now being instituted in a
balancing test. Id. at 2399. The
Framers attempted to prevent
the overuse and misuse of general searches by raising the required level of individualized
suspicion to objective probable
cause. Id Thus, in the criminal
context, mass suspicionless
searches, even if evenhandedly
conducted, were per se unreasonable where the search was
more than minimally intrusive.
Id. at 2400.
Justice O'Connor particularly disagreed with Justice
Scalia's characterization of the
degree ofintrusion that the District used in the collection ofthe
specimen. Id. She emphasized
that, though not the most intrusive of searches, the collection
of urine was still "'particularly
destructive of privacy and offensive to personal dignity.'"
Id (quoting Treasury Emp/oyeesv. Von Raab, 489U.S. 656,
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680 (1989». The dissent also
noted that such a test intruded
upon the freedom from searches ofthe person, one of the four
specific categories of searches
named in the Constitution and,
as such, should be viewed with
particular scrutiny. Id
The dissent next argued
that because such a blanket
search would involve literally
millions of children, as opposed
to only thousands under a suspicion-based testing program,
such a scheme would be "significantly less intrusive," and
as an established rule of law
should not easily be cast aside
in the name of policy. Id at
2403 (emphasis in original). The
dissent lastly argued that the
majority's decision was ofserious consequence to students'
individual rights under the Constitution, id at 2404 (citing
Tinker v. Des Moines Ind.
Comm. School Dist., 393 U.S.

503, 506 (1969) (holding that
students do not "shed their constitutional rights . . . at the
schoolhouse gate," in the context of free speech», and that
the District's suspicionless policy of testing all student athletes randomly selected swept
too broadly and imprecisely to
be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. Acton, 115 S. Ct.
at 2407.
In Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton, the
Supreme Court of the United
States held that warrantless, random, blanket drug tests on student athletes were not unreasonable in the totality of the
circumstances, and therefore not
violative of their Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable searches. The differing views ofthe majority and
the dissent can be seen as
primarily
based on their
respective view of schoolchil-

dren, the rights guaranteed to
them as such under the U. S.
Constitution, and the "reasonableness" of random testing.
Thus, the question is one of
degree, with the majority balancing the government's interest in drug free schools over
students' rights to freedom from
searches of their person absent
reasonable suspicion. In so
holding, the Court has furthered
the fight against drugs at the
cost of students' rights against
warrantless bodily intrusions
previously guaranteed by the
U.S. Constitution.

- Francis A. Pommett III

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 26.2 / U. Bait. L.F. - 63

